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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

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EXTRACTS FROM THE RUMANIAN PARTY'S STATEMENT
CONCERNING THE PROBLEMS OF THE WORLD COMMUNIST
AND WORKER'S MOVEMENT

ON CEMA

"The idea of a single planning body for all CEMA countries has the most serious economic and political implications. The planned management of the national economy is one of the fundamental, essential, and inalienable attributes of the sovereignty of the socialist state. . . ."

". . . Nobody can decide what is and what is not correct for other countries and parties. It is up to every Marxist-Leninist party, it is a sovereign right of each socialist state, to elaborate, choose, or change the forms and methods of socialist construction."


ON BLOC RELATIONS

"There does not and cannot exist a 'father' party and a 'son' party, parties that are 'superior' and parties that are 'subordinate,' but there exists the great family of Communist and worker's parties, which have equal rights."

"No party has or can have a privileged place, and can impose its line or opinions on other parties."

"It is the exclusive right of each party to independently work out its political line, its concrete objectives, the ways and means of attaining them"

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Rumania: The Rumanian party has unequivocally declared its right and intention to act independently within the Communist world.

This position was stated in a declaration drafted at the central committee plenum which met from 15 to 22 April to consider Rumania's position in intrabloc relations.

The document strongly emphasized the need to respect basic principles of equal rights, national sovereignty, and the national and historical differences among Communist states. Rumania, moreover, denied that any party had the right to be "superior" or to unilaterally direct the international movement.

The Rumanian statement attacks the Soviet-sponsored attempt to increase bloc economic integration through the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CEMA) and to give CEMA a supranational character, which the Rumanians claimed would infringe on the sovereignty of the member states.

Bucharest would expand CEMA by including all Communist countries and by granting limited participation to other countries which are moving toward "noncapitalist development."

Rumania indicated that it is generally opposed to all supranational organizations of Communist states and parties.

The declaration implicitly criticized both the Chinese and Soviet parties for their conduct in their dispute--the Chinese somewhat more than the Soviets--and for the damage which the dispute is doing to the international movement.

(continued)

The Rumanians call for efforts to prevent the Chinese and Soviet parties from formally splitting. Rumania favors formation of a commission of several parties to prepare thoroughly a new international Communist conference, which would be attended by "all parties."

The document clearly reveals that the Rumanian party fears a formal Sino-Soviet split would result in Moscow's attempt to impose strict discipline on the anti-Chinese parties. Rumania's declaration, which in effect generally agrees with Moscow's rather than Peiping's stance in their dispute, appears to serve notice that Bucharest will resist any attempt to impose such discipline.

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
South Korea: [The power struggle within the South Korean ruling Democratic-Republican Party is continuing]

[Critics of party strong man Kim Chong-pil are trying to convince President Pak Chong-hui that his own position will be jeopardized unless he gets rid of Kim. They are telling Pak that only Kim's removal can revive public support for the government and prevent new student demonstrations.]

[Pak will not bow easily to such pressure. Kim has been his right-hand man since the inception of the 1961 coup and Pak probably believes that he is irreplaceable. Yesterday Pak told newsmen that Kim's removal would not solve the political situation and that Kim was continuing as party chairman.]

[The students, who have not demonstrated since 22 April, have returned to their studies in response to government warnings and advice of university officials. The statement of the university officials, however, contained a warning of the need to clean up official corruption, to discontinue police surveillance of student activities, and to end current political strife.]

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Bolivia: Tension in Bolivia's tin mining areas has risen sharply in the past few days, and may foreshadow a revolt by miners loyal to leftist Vice President Juan Lechin.

A government appeal to the miners last weekend to disavow Lechinist leadership inspired progovernment miners to attack a radio station in Huanuni operated by Lechin's followers. This touched off a series of violent clashes between the two groups.

The outbursts prompted pro-Lechin miners in the large Catavi - Siglo Viente mining complex to walk off their jobs in protest. Other mining centers are threatening to go on strike today.

Lechin, who rushed to the scene of the fighting, made a fiery speech on 26 April, calling on the miners to unite and "fight to the death against American imperialism and the tyranny of Victor Paz." One Lechinist mine representative also demanded a "popular armed insurrection, beginning 1 May."

The US Embassy reports rumors that Lechinists will launch a terrorist campaign in all major cities, including La Paz, beginning on 2 May.

The opposition parties, except for the Communist Party, have rejected Lechin's proposal of an electoral front to support his candidacy for the presidency in the 31 May elections. Lechin knows that he has little chance of gaining power through the electoral process. Given the mood of his followers, he may now feel he has no choice but to make a bid for power by force of arms.

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Yemen-Egypt: The Yemeni republican government has been reorganized in a major attempt to broaden the base of the regime and make it more popular.

At a meeting on 27 April attended by Egyptian President Nasir, a new constitution establishing a consultative council with legislative powers was approved and Hammud al-Jayfi was entrusted with forming a new cabinet. These moves almost certainly foreshadow a dilution of the authority of President Sallal and those elements around him that have been most amenable to Egyptian influence.

The appointment of Jayfi, whom the Egyptians have long distrusted, is a measure of Cairo's concern over the recent deterioration of Sallal's control of internal affairs. Nasir suspects Jayfi of Baathist leanings and feels he might wish to limit the Egyptian role in Yemen. Jayfi spent the last year in virtual exile from Yemen as ambassador to Cairo.

Nevertheless, Jayfi is a forceful and relatively efficient administrator with considerable popularity among most Yemeni republican elements.

Nasir may hope that a broadening of the republican regime will improve chances for a compromise solution to the Yemeni problem with the Saudis. Saudi Crown Prince Faysal, however, will probably view this move as an indication that Egyptian troubles in Yemen are mounting.

Faysal now appears unwilling to proceed with a planned meeting with Nasir.

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NOTES

India: Nehru's series of talks beginning today with Sheikh Abdullah, the recently freed popular hero of Kashmir, will be crucial for the future stability of that state and for relations between India and Pakistan. Some Indian officials apparently are prepared to go quite far toward a compromise agreement involving a measure of autonomy for Kashmir. Pressure from extremist elements in India and from Pakistan in the UN Security Council will, however, make it increasingly difficult for Nehru and Abdullah to reach any agreement.

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Pakistan - Communist China: General Mohammad Musa, Pakistani Army commander in chief, has reportedly received an invitation to visit Communist China. President Ayub will probably authorize the trip in line with Pakistan's policy of "normalizing" relations with Peiping. Ayub accepted a similar invitation during Chou En-lai's February visit to Pakistan, and reportedly is considering going late this year.

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Burma: General Ne Win's order requiring all Buddhist organizations to register with the government by 15 May is coalescing opposition among the monks. Four monk groups in Mandalay, the center of Buddhist hostility to the regime, have announced they will not comply with the order, and some extremist monks are now reportedly advocating self-immolation as part of an all-out resistance campaign. Other influential Buddhist organizations have not yet reached a final decision on compliance.

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